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"A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions
throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental
consequences. Through ignorance or indifference we can do massive and
irreversible harm to the earthly environment .... I
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost forty years ago, the United Nations began recognizing a "rising
[environmental] crisis of worldwide proportions." 2 Around the same time, the
New Haven School was building worldwide "a jurisprudence of human
dignity." That jurisprudence, a combined effort of sociologist Harold D.
t Associate Professor at CUNY School of Law. I would like to thank Keith Aoki, Frank
Garcia, Hari Osofsky, Ruthann Robson, Dean Michelle Anderson, Andrew Willard, Amy Sinden,
Andrea McArdle and Judith Wise for reading drafts of this essay. Special thanks to Shalini Deo for
invaluable research assistance, to Monica Bell for her editorial suggestions, and to Naomi Florence
Shultz for her endless cooperation and assistance.
I. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration, 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972), reprinted in II I.L.M. 1416, 1417
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
2. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Problems of the
Human Environment, I, U.N. Doc. E/4667 (May 26, 1969).
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Lasswell and law professors Myres S. McDougal and Michael Reisman,
described itself as "a contextual, policy-oriented jurisprudence, postulating as
its overriding goal the dignity of man in an increasingly universal public
order." 3 Drawing on insights from the social and behavioral sciences,
Lasswell and McDougal developed an elaborate system of legal analysis
intended to flesh out the core values of human dignity, and the processes
necessary to translate those values into universal theories of legal
decisionmaking. 4 Their process-oriented jurisprudence produced an
impressive body of scholarship. 5 It remains one of the major theories of law
and one of the few that attempts to account for law in both domestic and
international arenas.
The relationship between human dignity and the human environment in
their jurisprudence raises a host of interesting questions. For example, what
should this relationship look like in the realm of sustainable development, a
topic central to current international environmental law discourse? Numerous
treaties, proclamations, and declarations have adopted sustainable
development as a goal, expressing it in terms of a global consensus.6
However, attempts to implement sustainable development rapidly run into a
Wittgensteinian dilemma where the same term means very different things to
different thinkers acting in a variety of contexts. 7 Thus, widespread agreement
on a principle does not translate into agreement on the principle's normative
content.
This Article suggests that a re-engagement with the New Haven
School's process-oriented jurisprudence might cast light on this dilemma that
3. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ix (1960).
4. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992) [hereinafter LASSWELL & McDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY].
5. These New Haven School thinkers produced too voluminous a literature to pernit
exhaustive citation. Publications I drew upon for this project include: LuNG-CHu CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE (2d ed.
2000); LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4; MYRES S.
McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE
PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981); MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL &
LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980); and Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International
Law on National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S. D. L. REV. 25 (1959) [hereinafter McDougal,
The Impact of International Law]. Other major New Haven School works are cited throughout this
essay.
6. Sustainable development is a central commitment of the U.N. Millennium Development
Goals, UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT
2006 (2006), available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2006/
MDGReport2006.pdf, and was the focus of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. See
U.N. Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Aft., Aug. 26-Sept. 4,
2002, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 199.20. The United Nations has established the U.N. Division for Sustainable
Development and the affiliated Commission on Sustainable Development. See United Nations
Commission on Sustainable Development, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/policy.htm (last visited
Apr. 27, 2007). In December 2002, the U.N. General Assembly declared 2005-2014 as a decade of
education for sustainable development. See G.A. Res. 57/254, 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/S7/254 (Dec. 20,
2002); UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/education/desd (last visited Apr. 27, 2007). See also PHILIPPE
SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 252-66 (2d ed. 2003) (presenting the
development of the concept of sustainable development in international environmental law).
7. See generally LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 26-34 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1999) (discussing ostensive definitions).
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international environmental law faces: how to reconcile the competing visions
of sustainable development offered by decisionmakers from widely different
cultures. To that end, this Article heeds the New Haven School's call for a
clearly defined methodology for identifying problems, goals, conflicting
claims, and imbedded policy choices. To account for the complex
interdependencies that pervade environmental interactions, 9 this Article
explores several important New Haven School tenets: its recognition that
every decisionmaker brings to the task of "authoritative decision" 1
0
perspectives embedded in her particular circumstance; its insistence that legal
decisions are inherently about policy; and its embrace of interdisciplinary
investigation. Ultimately, this Article suggests that environmental law,
domestic and international, must recognize the inescapable interdependence of
people and places, and therefore must embrace one of the most striking
attributes of the New Haven School line of reasoning, namely its "natural[]
receptive[ness] to both an ecological perspective and a futurist concern with
assuring the life-chances of subsequent generations."" Indeed, the New
Haven School's insistence that law and policy must begin from a global
concept of community, "premised on the interdependence of the entire earth-
space arena in which people interact," 12 ought to become a guiding insight for
modem international environmental law.
While some New Haven School ideas resonate powerfully in this
context, exploring this question also highlights some of their weaknesses. In
particular, New Haven School writings invoke scientific methods in a fashion
both instructive and cautionary. Their engagement with science is two-
pronged-sometimes offering their methods as a means for developing
scientific information, and sometimes as a means for rendering legal decisions
scientific. Exploration of these two strands of thought in the context of
sustainable development highlights some problematic questions about the
relationship between law, science and policy.
Part II of this essay gives a brief explanation of sustainable development
and exposes the conflicts that emerge as decisionmakers attempt to shape its
contours. Part III situates these conflicts within a globalizing world, in which
8. For example, McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman state that a configurative jurisprudence
must be contextual, problem-oriented, and multi-disciplinary. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell
& W. Michael Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 196 (1968) [hereinafter McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Prologue]. I take
seriously Professor Moore's injunction that "just as one should not imbue a methodology with the ability
to solve problems, one also should not underestimate the effect which a methodology can have on
problem solving." John Norton Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and
Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV. 662, 673-74 (1968).
9. A good general reference for applying New Haven School ideas to international
environmental law is ELLI LOUKA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FAIRNESS, EFFECTIVENESS,
AND WORLD ORDER (2006).
10. The New Haven School developed an extensive vocabulary of its own. A central concept,
authoritative decision, represents the synthesis of effective control with a legitimated process
comporting with the "shared expectations of the members of a community about how decisions should
be taken." McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Prologue, supra note 8, at 195 n. 15.
11. Richard A. Falk, The Sherrill Lectures delivered at the Yale Law School (1974), quoted in
Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented
Jurisprudence, I YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 11 (1974).
12. W. Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal: Architect of a Jurisprudence for a Free
Society, 66 Miss. L.J. 15, 19-20 (1996).
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new actors wield decisionmaking powers traditionally reserved to the state.
Part IV explores how these shifts in decisionmaking power shape competing
visions for achieving sustainable development by focusing on the debate over
precautionary versus risk-based analysis. Part V assesses the various roles
ascribed to science in resolving this dilemma and uses New Haven School
jurisprudence to examine the complex relationship between law, science, and
policy.
There is much to learn from New Haven School ideas about the
decisionmaking process and about the many conceptual layers on which legal
decisionmakers simultaneously engage. McDougal and Lasswell were ahead
of their time in recognizing that decisionmakers act in a context influenced by
community values, and answer to multiple constituencies, each of which
evaluates the decisions through the lens of its own set of values.
Understanding (and influencing) the contours of those decisions necessitates
first identifying and evaluating those values and contexts. Particularly as
suggestions of a unitary state are re-emerging in international legal
discourse,13 these New Haven School teachings are worth revisiting.
As a tool for determining how to best achieve the goals of sustainable
development, however, resort to New Haven School ideas can be
dissatisfying. Two rival methods offered as the means to achieve sustainable
development-precautionary and cost-benefit analysis-can each be
characterized as legitimate products of social world views that respect human
dignity; therefore, it is not clear that the New Haven School offers a means of
choosing or mediating between them. Moreover, questions surrounding the
role of science in New Haven School analysis are particularly troubling. New
Haven School writings embrace a relationship between law and science that
was deeply embedded in a particular historical and intellectual context. The
contemporary reader cannot help but question what appears to be an
unrealistic quest for precision in a world marked by chaos and change.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
In the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the international community
recognized that it was possible for humans to "do massive and irreversible
harm to the earthly environment on which our life and well-being depend.
14
Since that time, environmental law has become an integral part of the
international law world. The 1992 United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development 15 (UNCED or the Rio Conference) focused
global attention on environmental concerns and more particularly on the
unsustainable nature of human activities. The Rio Declaration highlighted the
poorly understood interactions between co-penetrating biological, physical
and social systems.' 6 More importantly, the Rio Declaration recognized that
13. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005).
14. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 1, T 6.
15. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
the Environment and Development, Annex I, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (1993)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
16. Id.
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human activity was undermining the integrity of natural systems on which
human life and society depend.
Rio marked a transition point-the point at which sustainability entered
environmental law's central narrative. 17 Sustainable development-the
satisfaction of human needs in a fashion that does not impede the ability of
future generations to also satisfy their needs' 8-became a new watchword in
international environmental discourse. From Rio onward, an explosion of
international treaty-making produced a wealth of multilateral environmental
agreements covering everything from access to environmental information
19
to greenhouse gas emissions 20 to persistent organic pollutants.21 Most or all of
these agreements purport to advance the goal of sustainability.
Despite this impressive body of normative law, one cannot escape the
sense that the project's practical success has been underwhelming. The
aggregate consequences of environmental exploitation continue to threaten the
very existence of life on earth 22 yet the legal project is stymied-unable to
convert progress in negotiating legal instruments into significant advances in
preserving and protecting the Earth's ecosystems. In many ways, the legal
project seems doomed from the start. After all, environmental problems
involve complex and ambiguous interactions between ecological and human
systems. Successfully responding to these problems requires a dynamic
balancing process capable of accounting for rapid technological change
amidst conflicting national imperatives.
As if straddling the conflicting imperatives of the "right to
development"' 23 and the "right to the environment"' 24 was not enough of a
17. Robert M. Cover describes this central narrative as the "nomos" of the law. Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983)
(detailing the "relations between the normative and the material universe, between the constraints of
reality and the demands of an ethic").
18. This definition comes from the Bruntland Commission. WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 42 (1987). A situation becomes
unsustainable when natural capital is depleted more rapidly than it can be replenished. Thus, at a
minimum, sustainability requires that human activity not exceed the regenerative rate for natural
resources and capacities.
19. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999).
20. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-
38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
21. U.N. Environment Programme, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
May 22, 2001,40 I.L.M. 532 (2001).
22. See, e.g., FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE: 2006 (2007), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/aO699e/aO699e.pdf, U.N.
Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994); INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS-SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, Annex, at 186,
U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986); see also THE RIGHT
TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Subrata Roy Choudhury et al. eds., 1992) (exploring the
ideological and theoretical grounding for a right to development); REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT (Arjun Sengupta et al. eds., 2005) (exploring links between social choice and the right to
development).
24. See Xiaobing Xu & George Wilson, On Conflict of Human Rights, 5 PIERCE L. REv. 31,
38-39 (2006) (discussing a broad construction of human rights that includes so-called 'third generation
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dialectical conundrum, the existence of global environmental challenges in a
world with clearly demarcated political boundaries makes it difficult for legal
decisionmakers to respond on an appropriate scale. Achieving a balance of
development and sustainability will require a dynamic, international process
of authoritative decisionmaking. Through this process, the world community
can respond to and manage change within a tangled web of social, political,
and ecological relationships.
Supporting that tangled web are three "interdependent and mutually
reinforcing pillars:" economic development, social development, and
environmental protection.2 5 The complex geometry of these three pillars shifts
from one situation to another. The sheer complexity of the natural systems on
which human life and society depend, and their myriad poorly-understood
interactions, means that sustainability entails managing dynamic systems
throughout their inflections of change.
Conflicts arise as individuals, groups, and societies seek to transform
"sustainable development" into practical strictures for business and
governance. 26 Despite some core agreement on the scope of the project, a
wide range of choices can be ascribed to the obligation of sustainable
development, growing out of a multiplicity of explicit and implicit
interpretations of its central principles. As societies adapt, apply, and interpret
"sustainable development," cracks inevitably appear in the fagade of
international commitment to common goals. These cracks in turn diminish the
ability of international law to achieve a minimum order consistent with these
goals.
The interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approach championed by the
New Haven School might help decisionmakers as they negotiate the divide
between the malleability of the sustainable development imperative and the
precision of the multilateral environmental agreements that shape international
environmental law. By adopting a self-consciously normative stance, this
approach could provide a systematic framework for assessing how to best
advance shared goals vis-A-vis sustainable development. Such an approach is
more likely to identify innovative opportunities for achieving these common
goals with minimum damage to the unshared goals of each community. The
next Parts will explore some of these opportunities, first pointing out the New
Haven School's lessons for a sustainable development analysis and then
highlighting some analytical weaknesses that such an application reveals.
rights,' such as development or environment rights). See generally Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the
Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It Depends on the Source, 12
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2001) (tracing the various arguments for a human right to
environment).
25. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 48, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005).
26. For a description of how these practices shape treaty rules in a process of "bottom-up"
lawmaking, see Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
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III. EVOLUTION OF DECISIONMAKING AUTHORITY
McDougal and Lasswell posited a process of "authoritative decision" by
which "the members of a community clarify and secure their common
interests. 27 This authoritative decision encompasses "the factors that affect
decision and the aggregate value consequences of different options in
decision." 28 Thus, for New Haven School thinkers, authoritative decision
forms a critical component of public order and global constitutive process.
29
In their systematic analysis, McDougal and Lasswell explored the relationship
between power and control, and attempted to reduce each identified decision
factor and value consequence into its component parts.
30
One of the New Haven School's great contributions to legal analysis,
both domestic and international, was its recognition that authoritative decision
includes a wide range of social and political outcomes, not merely court
decisions or negotiated treaties. Because they sought to illuminate the fashion
by which humanity "pursu[ed] values through institutions using resources," 31
the social processes of decisionmaking were necessarily central to their
thinking.
This broad view of authoritative decision has particular resonance in the
context of sustainable development which straddles global, national and local
decision processes.
Although the decision process for sustainable development often begins
internationally, with the diplomats of many states acting together to negotiate
a treaty, the real decisions about implementing these agreements occur
domestically, within the bureaucratic corps of each state. 32 Not only do these
decisionmakers bring a different set of biases and interests to this question,
but, as the New Haven School points out, their biases tend to reflect the values
of their wider communities. Because they draw on the authority of different
communities, these decisionmakers inevitably strike different balances for
prioritizing economic and environmental values as they work towards
sustainable development. The ambiguity of the agreements, so critical for
creating international consensus, creates space for conflicting interpretations
27. 1 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at xxi.
28. 1 id. at xxii. For an in-depth exploration of authoritative decision, see I id. at 335-709.
29. 1 id. at 167-77, 362. (defining constitutive processes as those that establish the processes
that will constitute authoritative decision and that sketch the contours of permissible participation in the
decision process.) See generally Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and W. Michael Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967) [hereinafter World
Constitutive Process] (exploring these ideas in detail).
30. 1 LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 335-61
(defining the value factors); World Constitutive Process, supra note 29, at 258-61 (describing the
decision process).
31. 1 LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 336,
375.
32. Among the important points that McDougal and Lasswell raised as a challenge to legal
realism was their insistence that actors other than judges made influential decisions about law and that
decisionmakers were guided by community preferences in exercising their decisionmaking authority.
Howard D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362,
373 (1971). It was this central insight that inspired the exploration of sustainable development in this
Article.
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at the hands of domestic decisionmakers-though each decisionmaker may be
authoritative at the national level.
It is an unfortunate reality that ecosystems are not co-extensive with the
jurisdictional reach of nation-states. 33 The mismatch between jurisdictional
boundaries and ecological boundaries means that it is not enough for
individual states to work towards sustainable development within their
domestic realms. International cooperation is necessary "to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystems., 34 Rather than
ensuring international cooperation, however, multilateral environmental
agreements may merely have shifted the struggle onto new ground; now,
debate centers on which conflicting interpretation of the agreements should
hold sway.
In today's world, the line between the decisions that several or all states
participate in making, what Professor McDougal termed "inclusive . . .
decision[s]," 35 and those that are the unique province of a single state,
McDougal's "exclusive decision[s]," 36 becomes ever more blurred. Just as
economic globalization 37 renders the territorial delimitation of states less
salient than it had been considered in the past; so too the global challenge of
sustainable development respects no arbitrary political lines drawn on maps
by the forces of history. As such, the decisionmaking processes of
international institutions charged with monitoring and enforcing the various
sustainable development agreements represent a new front in the struggle to
shape authoritative decision.
A. Authoritative Decision in the New World Order
Globalization, and particularly the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO)38 radically reconfigured decisionmaking for many
important public decisions. International organizations and transnational
corporations now play a role in decisions that had formerly been the purview
of states. This shift in turn raises questions about democratic legitimacy and
whether such decisions are truly "authoritative" in the New Haven School
sense of the word, that is, growing from community values and encompassing
both power and authority.
As the distinction between inclusive and exclusive decisions continues
to blur, this question attains additional urgency. The implementation of
treaties through adoption of domestic environmental protection standards,
once the sole preserve of individual states, has become the ground of the
community of states. Fundamental decisions about the degree and kind of risk
33. See TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER
ARBITRATION (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006); Rebecca Bratspies, Finessing
King Neptune: Fisheries Management and the Limits of International Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
213 (2001).
34. Rio Declaration, supra note 15, Principle 7.
35. McDougal, The Impact ofInternational Law, supra note 5, at 31.
36. Id.
37. For an excellent discussion of globalization and law, see Paul Schiff Berman, From
International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005).
38. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (commonly known as the Marrakesh Agreement).
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a society is willing to accept in anticipation of social and economic benefits
are no longer made wholly by states and local communities. One effect of the
move towards centralization is a shift in the locus of decision from the state,
and, at least in theory, a concomitant broadening of the "community" whose
values must be considered as part of the decision process.
In this new, more ambiguous system, a multiplicity of possible
authoritative decisionmakers jockey for influence: international organizations
promulgate standards that would traditionally have been the province of the
state; states continue to assert their authority; and transnational actors,
particularly corporations, set up alternative streams of power and control.
These developments open new venues for negotiation, and influential states
devote a great deal of energy to pressuring international organizations to adopt
standards consistent with their domestic regimes. While it remains true that no
single state may authoritatively impose its own unilateral interpretation of an
international agreement upon other states, in a growing number of
controversies states seem to be using the mechanisms of international
organizations in an attempt to do covertly what they cannot do overtly. In the
process, the international organizations are themselves modified: a
reconstituted vision of authoritative decisionmaking requires in turn a
reconstituted decisionmaker. The struggle is as much over how disputes
reshape international organizations in their role as decisionmaker as they are
about the particular decision in question.
The World Trade Organization has been a focal point for such contests.
Since its establishment in 1995, the WTO has become the institution through
which important international trade matters are discussed, including conflicts
between national policies and global trade rules. In a series of disputes,
member-states have attempted to use the WTO to reshape the domestic law of
their rivals. This top-down process is very different from the cooperation
between voluntary transgovernmental networks that Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Kal Raustiala and others describe. 39 The root contest is over which set of
values will take precedence at the point of conflict; i.e., will fear of possible
harm give way to desire for economic activity or vice versa? Perhaps even
more fundamentally, who will make this determination and via what
decisional process?
Since the late 1990s, the United States and the European Union have
been at loggerheads over the import and production of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) in agriculture.40 This trade dispute pits alternative visions
for managing risks in an uncertain world against one another. As such, the
GMO dispute is one iteration of a broader struggle over the values that will
guide authoritative decisionmaking in a globalized world. The same questions
and contentions are raised in the context of global warming, in the regulation
of toxic and hazardous substances, in fisheries management and in other
39. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) [hereinafter SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER]; Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-22 (2002).
40. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006)
[hereinafter Panel Report, E.C.-Biotech].
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circumstances too numerous to mention. The GMO dispute thus offers a
window into this ongoing contest over authoritative decisionmaking.
In previous eras, states would have been free to structure their regulatory
systems to reflect varying degrees of concern about consumer safety and
choice triggered by the availability of GMOs, varying worry about gene flow
from genetically modified crops to wild relatives, and varying levels of social
and political concern over the economic displacements that stem from
consolidation of agriculture. 41 Resort to the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism 42 effectively shifted that locus of decision from individual states to
a centralized international bureaucracy. The expanding authority of the WTO
is typically portrayed as a thickening of the legal-normative structures and a
corresponding receding of politics. This formula-"more law, less
Politics" 43 -sharply contrasts with New Haven School thinking about the
relationship between law and politics.
The WTO certainly has teeth. In a single decade it has become a primary
actor in international law, and it has the power to impose significant costs on
defectors. States disregard WTO decisions at their peril. Ad hoc WTO Panels
and the Appellate Body have become the decisionmakers who, through their
interpretation and construction of the WTO agreements, have begun to
articulate a definitive global understanding of how risk should be tolerated or
prevented. In the name of uniformity and facilitating international trade, the
mantle of authoritative decision has shifted from the national or local decision
processes that would formerly have resolved the disputes. Critics of this shift
point to a democracy deficit.44 They contend that the rising role of the WTO,
coupled with the growing influence of transnational corporations both
domestically and internationally, means that the key decisionmakers-and the
states that use the WTO processes-are no longer democratically accountable
to citizens.
41. See, e.g., Judith Wise, Hunger and Thieves: Anticipating the Impact of WTO Subsidies
Reform on Land and Survival in Brazil, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (examining the
pressure on indigenous land in Brazil resulting from the expansion of the export agriculture sector).
42. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding].
43. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997) (articulating the
dichotomy between "rule oriented" and "power oriented" dispute resolution); Miquel Montafi i Mora, A
GA 7T with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1, 6 (2005) (arguing that the WTO has insufficient participation or politics to sustain the high levels of
discipline or law).
44. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004) (arguing that decisions made by transnational actors are beyond the
direct democratic control or influence of the publics that they impact); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 18-22 (2002) (detailing how the IMF and the World Bank
contribute to a democracy deficit); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15
(proposing global administrative space as a new approach to resolving the democratic deficit);
Pauwelyn, supra note 43, at 6 (asserting that the WTO lacks popular support and input legitimacy). But
see SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 39, at 194-95 (observing that disaggregated
transgovemmental networks are not inconsistent with democracy); Raustiala, supra note 39, at 10-11
(theorizing that transgovemmental networks will supplement rather than supplant liberal
internationalism).
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Within the WTO process, this dispute takes a particular, stylized form.
Rather than a naked contest between sovereign states, each attempting to force
its vision of sustainability onto its trading partners in a globalizing economy,
the struggle is couched in terms of "science," "rationality" and "precaution."
However, this objectivist language is deceptive. The same regulatory decision
about whether to permit import or production of GMOs, for example, can be
cast as a measure pertaining to health and safety and morals, and thus
compatible with the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),45
or as a non-tariff trade barrier inconsistent with the GATT. 6 The difference
depends largely on the decisional stance and perspective of the viewer.47
There is a wholly legitimate perspective from which each characterization is
valid.
On the surface, the GMO dispute is a relatively mundane trade dispute
over the trade of commodities. However, the conflict over the proper
normative regulatory stance with regard to GMOs graphically illustrates the
collision of different processes of authoritative decision and competing social
preferences, each demanding recognition as the one true process. As such, this
dispute is emblematic of a broader struggle over how to define values and
goals in a shrinking, warming world, and over who will be the authoritative
decisionmakers in that process. These are the questions that New Haven
School thinkers had already begun exploring more than fifty years ago.
B. Future Generations and Authoritative Decision
One critical aspect of sustainable development is that it is intended to
conserve the earth's resources for the benefit of future generations.
Intergenerational equity requires that "each generation pass the planet on in no
worse condition than it received it and provide equitable access to its
resources and benefits." 48 As we consider authoritative decisionmaking, this
imperative must find its way into the mix. This is a point where New Haven
School ideas might usefully expand the dialogue. As early as the 1940s,
Lasswell and McDougal were already proclaiming, "'We assume that there is
today a world community in the fundamental sense that all peoples, whatever
45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization [Marrakesh Agreement], Annex IA, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]. A good introduction to
the WTO's decisions that impact environmental decisionmaking is available in LouKA, supra note 9, at
383-423.
46. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 27 (1994),
http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs.e/legal-e/17-tbt.pdf (balancing the "[d]esir[e] . . . to ensure that
technical regulations and standards ... do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade" with
the "[r]ecogni[tion] that no country should be prevented from taking [technical and environmental]
measures... at the levels it considers appropriate").
47. The operative words in the international discourse--"SPS measure," "trade barrier,"
'science" and "risk"--act more as labels describing the consequences of a decision rather than as
explanatory factors accounting for that decision. The words alone cannot create irreducible spheres for
regulatory activity nor can they articulate a bright line between the interpenetrating concepts of risk and
precaution.
48. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FuTuRE GENERATIONS 24 (1989).
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their location or function, are interdependent in achieving all the major values
of our time. ,,
49
If we are to take sustainability seriously, authoritative decisionmakers
must somehow include future generations as part of their calculus.
International environmental law struggles with how to account for the
interests of future generations and for the costs they will bear as they reap the
results of risks sown in the past and the present. For example, Article 3(1) of
the Framework Convention on Climate Change identifies as a basic principle
that "[t]he Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present
and future generations of humankind., 50 At the International Court of Justice,
Judge Weeramantry's separate opinion in the Maritime Delimitation in the
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway),5 1 his dissent
in Nuclear Tests 1995 (New Zealand v. France), 52 and his separate opinion in
Gabcikovo Nagymoros (Hungary v. Slovakia), explore the notion of the need
to consider future generations as participants in the sustainable development
project. Along the same lines, the Philippine Supreme Court recognized a
cause of action on behalf of future generations.
54
Despite the oft-repeated concern for intergenerational equity, that
principle is typically viewed more as a moral duty towards future generations,
rather than an imperative for transforming decisionmaking to include their
voice by proxy. The New Haven School perspective that clarification of
community goals necessarily involves assessing those goals across time may
offer an answer to this challenge, and a means of expanding the
decisionmakers to include a more direct voice for future generations.
IV. CHOOSING BETWEEN COMPETING VISIONS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
As the complexity of environmental problems has mushroomed, and
ambiguities inherent in the term sustainability have mounted, so too has
controversy about the proper means of analysis. States tend to divide along a
fault line of how regulatory policy should achieve sustainability. Where some
states view precautionary analysis as an integral part of sustainable
49. Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future, 56 YALE L.J. 1345, 1352 (1947)
(citation omitted).
50. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 20, art. 3, para. 1.
51. In this opinion, Judge Weeramantry referred to intergenerational equity, and specifically
to "the concept of wise stewardship [of natural resources] ... and their conservation for the benefit of
future generations." Maritime Delimination in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 241-43 (June 14) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
52. In his dissenting opinion in Nuclear Tests 1995, Judge Weeramantry characterized the
issue before the court as raising "as no case before the court has done, the principle of intergenerational
equity-an important and rapidly developing principle of contemporary environmental law." Request
for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20
December 1974 in the Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 341 (Sept. 22)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry). He went on to note, "This case ... raises in pointed form
the possibility of damage to generations yet unborn." Id.
53. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymoros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 110
(Sept. 27).
54. Oposa v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083 (S.C., July 30, 1993), available at
http://www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?ID=278
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development, 55 others would use cost-benefit analysis56 to balance sustainable
development's competing imperatives. Thus, the two analyses vie to shape the
ongoing constitutive process by which authoritative decision is created,
maintained, and modified. They begin from different normative stances and
proceed along divergent interpretive trajectories. As such, they reflect
different framings of technology's social implications and different appraisals
of the feasibility of control. To characterize a choice between these two
approaches as a choice between policy and science, however, creates a false
dichotomy. Instead, each approach represents a particular political view of
how best to resolve the challenges posed by sustainable development.
A great insight of New Haven School thinking is the embrace of context
and politics as an inherent part, rather than a corruption of, the legal process.
Different communities could reach different conclusions about law based on
their unique political circumstances and as long as the results did not
compromise the goal of human dignity, the different results would be
legitimate as authoritative decisions. Thus, for New Haven School thinkers, it
would not be a problem that advocates of the two approaches line up largely
along national lines-with Americans as the primary advocates of cost-benefit
analysis and Europeans proposing precautionary regulation instead.58 The fact
that the differing approaches reflect different assessments of the power of
science and scientific inquiry to reveal the truth, with Europeans far more
skeptical than Americans about the scientific endeavor, would simply be a
reflection of differing community values and priorities. 59 New Haven School
ideas would recognize that both approaches draw on the authority of different
communities and embody different constitutive decisions about the
acceptability of assuming risk in light of scientific uncertainty. These
differences lead inevitably to public order decisions embodying the respective
processes for prioritizing economic and environmental values.
55. The precautionary principle was first articulated in the World Charter for Nature, G.A.
Res. 7, 14-24, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4 (Oct. 28, 1982). Today, various formulations of the precautionary
principle can be found in many treaties. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 15, Principle 15;
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks arts. 5-7, Aug. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542, 1550-53 (1995); Organization
of African Unity, Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa art. 4(3)(f), Jan. 30,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 773, 781 (1991); U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 20, art.
3.3; U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 2, 6,
June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822 (1992); Stockholm Convention on Implementing International Action
on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants arts. 1, 8.9, May 22, 2001,40 I.L.M. 532 (2001).
56. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environment and Economic
Development: Article 121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 583
(2000). See generally DAVID W. PEARCE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(1988) (arguing that environmental costs can be valued and included in cost-benefit analysis in order to
achieve sustainable development.).
57. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Prologue, supra note 8, at 206 (advising that explicit
comparison of rival systems of public order should be done in terms of their "consequences for preferred
values").
58. See, e.g., Samuel Loewenberg, Precaution Is for Europeans, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, §
4 (Week in Review), at 14. The rest of the world has lined up in either the American or the European
camps, depending as much on primary trading alliances as on domestic proclivities.
59. Neither the European nor American view, as I have labeled them, is uncontested within its
respective domestic sphere, and I do not mean to discount domestic critics.
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The problem is that the world has changed, and the boundaries of
authoritative decision are no longer clear. Where states formerly would have
pursued their own vision and balance, a world of ever denser interconnection
means that the two perspectives, even if wholly valid expressions of
community preference, cannot readily co-exist. As decisionmaking
centralizes, the struggle over which approach will attain dominance becomes
increasingly contentious. 60 This contest takes place against a backdrop of a
world that not only embraces sustainable development, but is also in the
throes of unparalleled industrial growth and integration. As such, it is one
salvo in a broader struggle for dominance between those who view the world
through the lens of the market and its efficiency, and those who would order
society according to other values.
61
The WTO finds itself having to choose between two normative
strategies that diverge sharply and prioritize strikingly different social goals.62
At stake is not merely the definition of just and proper rules of legal
interpretation for a specific dispute, but also the nature, power, and function of
governments in relation to their citizens and the broader world in which they
exist.63 It may not be too grand a characterization to view this contest as a
competition between "aspiring systems of world public order," 64 with an
efficiency-based, utility-maximizing perspective that seeks to detach itself
from its contextual moorings in pursuit of an abstract ideal of "science" and
"rationality" engaged in a power struggle with a contextual, precautionary
process, steeped in complexity and indeterminacy. New Haven School
60. For a discussion about how law is an ongoing process situated squarely within a larger
social context, see Myres McDougal, Howard Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, World Constitutive
Process, supra note 29, at 404.
61. There are very real differences between those who believe that globalized free markets
will solve most human problems and those who view those same markets as the source of many human
problems. For differing perspectives on this big-picture question, see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (exploring the inequities inherent to economic
globalization); and THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (2000) (providing an
optimistic vision of how markets shape globalization).
62. See Rebecca Bratspies, Trail Smelter's (semi)Precautionary Legacy, in TRANSBOUNDARY
HARM, supra note 33, at 153, 159-62. A major criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that it typically does
not consider the social distribution of costs and benefits. Environmental risks tend to be bome
disproportionately by a society's most vulnerable populations-the economically and politically
disadvantaged, and frequently people of color-who are also less likely to share in the benefits that
make up the other side of the cost-benefit calculus. See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN
GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, AND REGULATION (2002) (surveying and explaining
the scholarly literature on environmental justice). What is often portrayed as an analytical preference for
redistribution through private contracting rather than social planning operates-systematically and
predictably-to preclude certain segments of the population from the promises of Coasean bargaining.
63. This struggle over regulatory frameworks reveals the poverty of the world view that
conflates authority with power, and then compounds its error by defining power wholly with reference
to coercive ability. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 3-6. See generally ROBERT
KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICAN AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (offering
a vision of power based wholly on military might). But see Rebecca M. Bratspies, This Too Shall Pass:
A Response to Kagan's Power and Weakness, 4 GERMAN L.J. 889 (2003), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.org/pdf/Vol04No09/PDF Vol_04 No 09_889-899_ SIlBratspies.pdf
(last visited Apr. 27, 2007). Such a view must be unacceptable to those who look for justice and
democracy under law.
64. McDougal, The Impact of International Law, supra note 5, at 26. Although McDougal
wrote this phrase to refer to the Cold War, its use in this context seems apt, as the struggle takes place
against the backdrop of the ideology of sovereignty.
2007] Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Environmental Law 377
thinking, which combines a pursuit of "science" with an embrace of context
might provide a new way of approaching this struggle.
65
V. THE ROLE OF SCIENCE
A useful insight from McDougal, Lasswell and the other New Haven
School thinkers is that law and policy are inextricably intertwined and that any
attempt to separate law from policy is itself a policy argument advocating,
albeit implicitly, for maintaining the status quo.66 While law may indeed be
policy, policy is not science. As will be described below, cost-benefit and
precautionary analyses go beyond the production of data to interpretations of
their implications for the world-and thus leave the realm of science for that
of normative judgments and relative assessments. Science can provide
information, but a decision to regulate is necessarily political, as it entails
assessing acceptability-both of risks and of the costs imposed to avoid or
mitigate those risks. Science has little to say about what risks are acceptable to
a society, nor about which configuration of law, science, politics, and
economics should be adopted when their imperatives conflict.
The School's frequent rhetoric about science seems to reflect an
intellectual yearning for a discipline that transcends politics, perhaps to
replace the shattered image of law that the New Haven School and the legal
realists wrested from that privileged position.67 Earlier writings, in particular,
emphasized scientific process and thought. Indeed, this tendency is a
weakness to which New Haven School writing has been prone-the belief that
enough information will render decisions value-free. No amount of wishing,
however, can give legal thinkers the legal equivalent of Archimedes'
proverbial place to stand from which he would move the world-a value-
neutral decisional process. 68 Nor will an analytical method, no matter how
detailed, solve problems by itself.
Science provides vital information for decisionmaking, but the processes
of assessing and weighing scientific information are deeply political and
contextual. Indeed, in the environmental context, a furious debate over the
difference between science and science policy has repeatedly underscored this
65. In this brief Article, I can do no more than introduce the competing claims and suggest
some of the ways that New Haven School thinking might provide some fruitful lines of inquiry. Actually
pursuing those inquiries and drawing conclusions will have to wait for another day.
66. Of course, a similar critique can be leveled at arguments for change but, in the latter case,
the speculations are more easily revealed for what they are and assessed on that basis. The speculation
inherent in arguments that favor the status quo is much more difficult to identify-again, a valuable
lesson from the New Haven School. See, e.g., Suzuki, supra note 11, at 2.
.67. The legal realists also turned to the social sciences, but not in the systematic way that
Lasswell and McDougal advocated. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, The Relation of
Law to Social Process: Trends in Theories About Law, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 465, 467 (1976). Since
Lasswell was a social scientist by training, their collaboration had from the beginning a stronger
grounding in social science methodology than that of most other legal realists.
68. 1 say this without any intention of rehashing the constructivist/objectivist science wars of
the late 1980s. Regardless of how one views the data generated by the scientific process, the
interpretation of that data to determine appropriate policies for governmental action is a political rather
than scientific process.
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observation. 69 Science involves testable empirical claims, while science policy
applies the insights of science in a political and social context marked by
contested visions of the values that should guide its application. 70 Scientific
knowledge may lead two equally competent observers to quite different
conclusions about "correct" policy choices.7'
As a result, scientific information cannot, itself, generate determinate
answers to policy questions. When an issue is both politically and
scientifically contentious, it is possible for multiple perspectives to muster a
compelling array of scientific support for their diverse perspectives. Choosing
between them is an act of politics. As such, it is not a process driven by
rational analysis or expert judgment, but by public debate about competing
interests and values. 72 Indeed Lasswell and McDougal themselves cautioned
that overstating the virtues of scientific modes of thought and investigation as
a solution to policy questions does a disservice to science and to policy. 73 As
Harold Lasswell noted, this process produces a politically, economically, and
emotionally acceptable solution rather than the illusive "rationally best"
solution.74 In part, this is because the range of scientific perspectives is
sufficiently rich and diverse to support conflicting political and public values.
When confronted with distinctly different scientific frames of reference
offering irreconcilable information about nature, resort to science detached
from context cannot absolve authoritative decisionmakers from making
challenging political choices.
McDougal and Lasswell attempted to establish the social sciences as an
invaluable source of normative guidance in legal decisionmaking. However,
they were also well aware that their project could dwindle into merely
borrowing the luster of science to give the impression that a legal critique was
"scientific[ally]" informed.75 We see the manifestations of this risk in the cost-
69. See, e.g., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Stcinzor eds., 2006) (exploring the intricate
interconnections between science and policy, and showing that most regulatory decisions involve a
mixture of both scientific and policy-based rationales); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1639-40 (1995) (describing how decisionmakers cloak
controversial policy decisions in the veneer of science).
70. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Resisting Regulation with Blue Ribbon Panels, 33 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1157 (2006) (noting that science is invariably contestable, and that there is a strong incentive
to present scientific information to regulators in a fashion that advances a preferred regulatory outcome).
71. For example, several recent reports identify regional, ecosystem-based management as the
answer to dwindling fish stocks and threatened marine environments. Such pronouncements are
wrapped self-assuredly in an aura of scientific invincibility. However, these pronouncements all beg the
question of how to identify the relevant region or ecosystem in which management should take place.
The Gulf of Maine and the Southern Ocean (to name two examples) are each susceptible to multiple
regional definitions depending on the mapping technique employed, the values considered in the line-
drawing process, and the interests to be maximized or minimized. Lewis M. Alexander, Regional
Arrangements in the Oceans, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1977). This multiplicity of possible regions exists
even though scientific information is used as the basis for decisionmaking. It is the choice to rely on
particular pieces of scientific information and not others (rather than the data itself) that ultimately
shapes the zone within which regional, ecosystem-based management will occur.
72. Daniel Sarewitz, Science and Environmental Policy: An Excess of Objectivity, in THE
EARTH SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY (Robert Frodeman ed., 2000).
73. Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, supra note 32, at 373-74.
74. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 184-85 (Phoenix ed. 1977).
75. See Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
335, 337-39 (1988).
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benefit 76 versus precautionary debate. The trappings of a scientific process,
particularly the ability to reduce issues to numbers and to run complex
equations, can be used to obscure contingent and value-driven decisions under
an enveloping cloak of assumed objectivity.77 A veneer of legitimacy created
by frequent resort to numbers and equations gives the illusion of detached,
logical, and perhaps most important, value-neutral methodology. 78 Such a
characterization overstates the possibilities of cost-benefit analysis by
ignoring its intellectual boundaries.
To some extent, New Haven School writings embrace an enlightenment
confidence in the power of science to provide concrete and neutral
information. The most fundamental tenets of modem science involve the
acknowledgement of chaos, uncertainty, and indeterminacy. A seeming
unwillingness to grapple with the contingent nature of science itself is one of
the weaknesses of early New Haven School writings that it would be a shame
to see writ large across the field of international environmental law. The
notion that "[a]ll the factors which may affect the outcome of a decision are to
be identified and weighed ' 79 rings false to the contemporary ear. While
systematic analysis is the root of sound policy, over-reliance on the neutrality
of scientific processes can become a license to polemics. It is important not to
assume the attainability of an unrealistic state of detachment because the
pursuit of such a state will warp the perspective of the decisionmaker even
further than do the personal factors that already shape their perspectives.
New Haven School thinking thus straddles two opposing tendencies with
regard to its conception of science. Science is a tool to inform legal analysis
but is also sometimes offered as the goal towards which legal analysis should
be striving. These competing visions of science find their echo in the
international community's struggle to reconcile competing conceptual frames
for generating and evaluating scientific data. While the New Haven School's
commitment to empiricism, coupled with a deep skepticism about objectivity,
offers an important starting point for analysis, the current struggle between
cost-benefit analysis and precaution in the environmental arena mirrors this
internal conflict within New Haven School thinking.
76. Cost-benefit analysis figured prominently in President Reagan's Exec. Order 12,291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866,3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1994). This order was part of the Reagan Administration's broader anti-regulatory agenda, which
was designed to dismantle the administrative state in the belief that private ordering was preferable to
administrative regulation. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to
Regulating Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007). President
Clinton revoked Executive Order 12,291 but left the use of cost-benefit analysis largely intact. See Exec.
Order No. 12,866, supra; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CM. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1995).
77. For a detailed breakdown of how purportedly scientific numbers about costs and benefits
have been used to distort regulatory discussions, see Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998).
78. David Driesen demonstrates that cost-benefit analysis is inherently value-laden both on a
theoretical and "as applied" basis. See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 COLO. L.
REv. 335 (2006); David Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545 (1997).
79. Frederick Samson Tipson, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public
Order of Human Dignity, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 535, 573 (1974).
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How New Haven School ideas might inform the interaction between
these competing processes for authoritative decisionmaking is a rich area of
further study. Using New Haven School ideas as a lens for exploring this
dispute highlights the ways that science rhetoric is used to shape
decisionmaking processes. At the same time, examining this dispute sharpens
the distinctions between the differing strands of science talk within the New
Haven School.
A. Cost Benefit Analysis and Precaution
One approach for trying to achieve rationality in the policymaking
process is to treat science as a neutral space from which politics is strictly
excluded. An alternative vision tries to embed scientific information firmly
within political processes. The former approach finds its expression in the
U.S. version of cost-benefit analysis, the latter in the European policy of
precaution.
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cost-benefit analysis as developed and promoted in the United States as
a means of risk assessment hearkens back to the strain of New Haven School
thinking that treats scientific rationality as the legal policy goal to be achieved
through matrices and analytical processes. Operating from the central
normative contention that regulation can best perform its essential function for
the community when it distances itself from overt social policy, 80 cost-benefit
analysis seeks to use science to minimize the political character of the legal
decisionmaking process.81
A side-effect of this quest to import scientific precision into the legal
system is that cost-benefit analyses can justify deferring difficult and
potentially costly decisions on the ground that scientific evidence of their
80. One of the more often cited discussions advocating risk-based or cost-benefit analysis
appears in JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995). A former Harvard professor, Graham has spent the
last few years implementing his version of risk analysis through his role as Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Critics have pointed out that his version of cost-benefit analysis
systematically overstates the costs to industry of regulation while systematically devaluing the benefits
derived from regulation. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING, 35-40 (2004); Frank Ackerman, Lisa
Heinzerling & Rachel Massey, Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection
Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155 (2005); Mark Sagoff, Can Environmentalists Be Liberals?:
Jurisprudential Foundations of Environmentalism, 16 ENVTL. L. 775 (1986); FRANK CLEMENTE &
MELISSA LUTrRELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN'S COMMENTS ON OMB's 2001 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (Aug. 15, 2001),
http://www.citizen.org/congress/regulations/bushadmin/articles.cfn?ID=6691 (characterizing the entire
report as a "monumental, complex waste of time").
81. In doing so, cost-benefit theorists hearken back to Wechsler's search for "neutral
principles" and are subject to the same critique. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also M.P. Golding, Principled Decision-making and
the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 55 (1963); Arthur Selwyn Miller, Notes on the Concept of
the "Living" Constitution, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 881, 904 (1963) (rejecting the possibility of
identifying neutral principles for choosing between competing values). For a thoroughly reasoned
rejection of the notion that cost-benefit analysis is "neutral," see generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING,
supra note 81 (describing and rejecting the many value assumptions built into cost-benefit analysis.)
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necessity is wanting. Lasswell and McDougal presciently cautioned that
attempts to separate law and policy too often wind up as an implicit defense of
the status quo. Like the U.S. approach to cost-benefit analysis, this aspect of
the New Haven School's thinking about science embodies the contradiction
between a quest for certainty and the embrace of policy in legal
decisionmaking. Thus, cost-benefit analysis can be situated directly within the
internal tensions in New Haven School thinking between the recognition that
law is about policy and the school's elaborate matrices which are clearly
intended to make the process of legal analysis "scientific."
82
2. Precaution
Precautionary analysis is generally offered as an antidote and antonym
to cost-benefit analysis. At the most basic level, the precautionary principle
stands for the "common sense idea that public and private interests should act
to prevent harm." 83 That means that decision makers must not wait for
unambiguous proof of a cause and effect relationship between a substance,
process, or activity and an environmental harm before acting to reduce or
eliminate the harm. Thus, precautionary analysis to some extent responds to
the New Haven School concern about valorizing the status quo.
A precautionary approach implies that decisions concerning the possibly
unacceptable but as-yet-unknown effects of regulatory choices cannot be
made once and for all, but must always be viewed as somewhat preliminary,
open to revisions based on social changes or new relevant information.
Scientific information is certainly important to precautionary analysis, but it is
only one tool among many rather than the sole consideration. As such,
precaution is not so much a rule as a process-it serves as a guide for the
process of interpretation and norm formation towards sustainability. It is
perhaps best perceived as "a meta-juridical principle which provides a conduit
between legal and non-legal forms of normativity,"86 a description that raises
some parallels to New Haven School ideas about interdisciplinarity and its
role in mediating the relationship between law and policy.
82. Lasswell and McDougal would never have fully embraced the neutrality assumptions that
accompany cost-benefit analysis because they viewed the social sciences as a "collection of conceptual
tools" for making law's value explicit. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 175
(1995).
83. Phillipe H. Martin, /f You Don't Know How To Fix It, Please Stop Breaking It! The
Precautionary Principle and Climate Change, 2 FOUNDATIONS OF Sci. 263, 264 (1997) (citing
INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Tim O'Riordan et al. eds., 1997)).
84. As noted earlier, the most familiar version of the precautionary principle appears in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations Conference of the Environment and
Development. However, general agreement dates the first clear articulations of the precautionary
principle from the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, see supra note I, and the 1982
World Charter for Nature. In particular, the World Charter for Nature provided: "Activities which are
likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their
proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where
potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed." World Charter for
Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, 11 (b), U.N. Doe. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982).
85. See James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle in International Law, in
REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 13 (Tim O'Riordan et al. eds., 200 1).
86. Jaye Ellis, Overexploitation of a Valuable Resource? New Literature on the Precautionary
Principle, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445, 458 (2006).
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B. The Relationship Between the Two Approaches
This question of how to choose between precautionary and cost-benefit
approaches continues to surface in international law. While New Haven
School ideas help highlight the different contexts that produce these different
visions, they are less useful in navigating between the different approaches.
Notwithstanding vigorous domestic debate, 87 the United States
government has embraced cost-benefit analysis full on and is seeking to
persuade, cajole, and/or force the rest of the world to employ this analysis in a
host of disparate contexts ranging from food safety88 to global warming.
89
U.S. politicians frequently use their platforms before international
organizations to advocate the adoption of this cost-benefit analysis process,
thus underscoring its overtly political nature even as the discussion hides
behind the seemingly neutral mantle of promoting science.
90
It is a tough sell. In the wake of environmental catastrophes including
Bhopal, Exxon-Valdez, and Chernobyl, precaution has become a significant
decisional concept in international environmental law. Indeed, the
precautionary principle is often portrayed by its proponents as a rule of
customary international law 91 -a characterization heavily disputed by its
opponents. Regardless of the approach's precise status, climate change, with
its looming, potentially catastrophic unknowns, seems tailor-made for
precautionary analysis. So too, the spread of GMOs, where there is an
unquantifiable risk of permanent devastating harm that can only be detected
with certainty after the fact. Precaution's growing influence can be attributed,
at least in part, to the contingent nature of harms in a global economy.
92
87. The scholarly voices weighing in on this topic are far too numerous to list here. For an
exploration of some of the issues embedded in this debate, from those favorably disposed to cost-benefit
analysis, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004) (embracing
a modest form of precaution); James K. Boyce, Let Them Eat Risk? Wealth, Rights, and Disaster
Vulnerability, 24 DISASTERS 254 (2000) (exploring how and whether risks are included in a cost-benefit
analysis); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165
(1999) (critiquing cost-benefit analysis); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost
Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 Sci. 221 (1996) (suggesting that cost-
benefit analysis is useful but ought not be the sole ground for decisionmaking); Cass R. Sunstein,
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000) (grounding a defense of cost-
benefit analysis in cognitive psychology).
88. See, e.g., Panel Report, E.C.-Biotech, supra note 40; Appellate Body Report, European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan.
16, 1998).
89. See, e.g., Efforts to Influence Science Policy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Investigation and Oversight, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Dr. James McCarthy, Professor, Harvard
University); Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at A 1.
90. Damian Carrington, Albright Marries Science and Diplomacy, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/specials/washington-2000/652230.stm (describing Madeline
Albright's February 2000 plenary address to the American Association for the Advancement of Science
which emphasized the close coupling of science and politics).
91. ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 260-84 (2002). But see Ellis, supra note 86, at 447-50 (expressing the view that
debate over the status of the precautionary principle as customary law is a sidelight that does not affect
the principle's broader application and influence).
92. See Jon van Dyke, The Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precautionary
Principle, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 357 (David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
2004).
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As precautionary decisionmaking has gathered steam, a backlash led by
scholars and officials in the United States has emerged.9 3 Critics characterize
the precautionary principle as too indeterminate and no more meaningful than
saying "take care" 94 or "better safe than sorry," 95 and they emphasize
confusion about the core meaning of the term. Indeed, at least one U.S.
official has characterized the precautionary principle as "a mythical concept,
perhaps like a unicorn." 97 The ensuing ambiguity, it is claimed, permits
political concerns rather than science to drive regulatory decisions." While
from a New Haven School perspective this attempt to separate law from
policy makes no sense, Frank Garcia points out that this issue of allowing
political concerns too much sway over substantive decisions has a particular
resonance in a trade context because opposition to politicization (in the form
of disguised protectionism) is a core value of the trade system. 99
Critics also decry the precautionary principle as imposing unnecessary
costs to address remote and improbable harms. The basis for this critique is
obvious. Precautionary regulation restricts human actions and imposes costs
that cannot be grounded in unambiguous scientific evidence. As such, critics
compare it unfavorably with quantitative risk assessment which rarely permits
regulation without scientific evidence of a "significant risk[]."' 100 Typically
motivated by the assumption that economic expansion and technological
innovation increase overall social welfare, these critics perceive the
precautionary principle as an unwelcome and technically unsound deviation
from science-based regulation, and often perceive it to be little more than a
non-tariff trade barrier in disguise.' 01
Applying New Haven School jurisprudential theories to assess the
balance that should be struck between demands for cost-benefit or
precautionary analyses in the international arena means walking an uneasy
line. On the one hand, American liberal democratic values are the ideological
93. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PENN. L. REV.
1003 (2003); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 207 (2003).
94. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENvTL. L. REP.
10790, 10792 (2001).
95. Frank Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
851,851 (1996).
96. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Deconstructing the Precautionary Principle, in BRINGING
NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS, supra note 92, at 381.
97. See John D. Graham, Administrator, Off. of Info. & Reg. Aff., The Role of Precaution in
Risk Assessment and Management: An American's View, Address Before the European Commission
(Jan. 11-12, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eu-speech.html.
98. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 853 (2006)
(describing the precautionary principle as incoherent and "stand[ing] as an obstacle to regulation and
nonregulation, and to everything in between"). For a critique of this viewpoint, see Ellis, supra note 86.
99. E-mail from Frank Garcia, Professor, Boston College Law School, to the Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law (Mar. 6, 2007, 21:02 EST) (on file with author).
100. See Cross, supra note 95, at 923.
101. See Lawrence A. Kogan, Exporting Precaution: How Europe's Risk-Free Regulatory
Agenda Threatens American Free Enterprise (2005), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/
110405MONOKogan.pdf. The European Union, by contrast, has embraced the precautionary principle.
See Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 (Feb. 2,
2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healthconsumer/library/pub/pub07.en.pdf; Treaty
Establishing Constitution for Europe art. 111-233, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/ptoc46_en.htm (enshrining precaution as a constitutional principle).
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backdrop for Lasswell and McDougal's jurisprudence. Their universalization
of the American perspective finds its echo in a parallel aspect of the push to
force adoption of cost-benefit analysis through the WTO. Yet that process's
embrace of scientific neutrality10 2 divorced from normative values seems to
contradict a central New Haven School tenet-that law and policy are deeply
interrelated-and flies in the face of the unabashedly value-laden form of
inquiry they advanced.
C. Exploring the Critiques Through a New Haven School Lens
The point of departure between cost-benefit analysis and precaution is
how each accounts for the many uncertainties embedded in complex
environmental questions and their possible solutions. Uncertainties about the
scale or even the very existence of a problem, or about the viability of a
solution, 0 3 lead the two analytical approaches in widely divergent directions,
with precautionary advocates willing to act despite scientific uncertainty about
harm, while risk-based assessment advocates view preventive or palliative
actions as illegitimate unless grounded in concrete scientific determinations of
harm. The two approaches thus vary widely in the room they offer
decisionmakers to maneuver based on judgments of how to best approach
unknowns and uncertainties. For all of the New Haven School's rhetoric about
science, its writings are surprisingly silent about scientific uncertainty. There
seems to be an assumption that scientific processes will increase useful
information upon which decisions can be made rather than generate further
uncertainty.
At the highest level of abstraction, precautionary and cost-benefit
analysis converge, with the primary difference being one of emphasis rather
than kind. After all, there is not much difference between pronouncements
that decisionmakers must fully assess all costs and benefits before permitting
actions, and requiring that those same decisionmakers employ a precautionary
approach. 104 Indeed, cost-benefit analysis figures prominently in the most
102. A host of commentators have demonstrated the structural biases inherent to cost-benefit
analysis. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 80, at 35-40; Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law
and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2028 (1999); Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50
ADMIN. L. REv. 7, 71-72 (1998) (citing Douglas E. MacLean, Comparing Values in Environmental
Policies: Moral Issues and Moral Arguments, in VALUING HEALTH RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 83, 95 (P. Brett Hammond & Rob Coppock eds., 1990)). Laurence
Tribe has characterized cost-benefit analysis as offering "illusory precision and the pretended neutrality
of a pseudo-scientific calculus." Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution
Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155 (1984).
103. There are additional levels of uncertainty when one also considers the indeterminacy
created because of the evolutionary nature of complex systems and the unpredictability of their response
to human intervention.
104. Although I use the terms "precautionary approach" and "the precautionary principle"
interchangeably, I am not unaware that some have suggested that there are important nuances separating
the precautionary principle from a precautionary approach. See, e.g., FRANCISCO ORREGO VICINfA, THE
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 157 (1999). Indeed, three of the separate
opinions issued in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases echoed this idea, suggesting that a precautionary
approach was more flexible than the precautionary principle. See Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. & Austl.
v. Japan), Order Granting Requests for Provisional Measures, 3 Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea Rep. 280, 305
(Aug. 27, 1999) (separate opinion of Judge Laing); id. at 316 (separate opinion of Judge Treves); id. at
320 (separate opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Shearer). Others roundly reject this characterization, arguing that
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heralded statement of the precautionary principle' 05-Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration-which states: "In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."'
10 6
As always, the devil is in the details. Cost-benefit analysis ideally
consists of identifying every cost and every benefit; reducing them all to the
same approximate unit of measure; and then comparing costs and benefits. As
such, it seems in line with the New Haven School call to explore "all available
knowledge and probabilities and all possible alternatives"'1 7 before making a
decision. In the abstract such an approach holds some intellectual appeal, but
to do it properly requires an unrealistically exhaustive analysis and an
immense commitment of resources. And, of course, the problem of
uncertainty remains.
When confronting well-defined or familiar risks, most decisionmakers
are relatively confident in their ability to make an assessment and to decide
accordingly. Other situations pose novel or unstructured risks-risks whose
predominant characteristic is uncertainty.' 0 8 In such situations, there is no
clear sense of the probability that a risk will manifest or the magnitude of
harm that the risk will impose on society. It is with regard to these latter risks
that precaution and cost-benefit analysis struggle for dominance. At the
margins, and indeed it is at the margins that these approaches differ most
markedly, precautionary analysis errs on the side of over-regulation, even at
the risk of suppressing useful activity. By contrast, cost-benefit analysis
creates a systematic bias towards preserving the status quo-the costs of
change are often more readily calculable than are the disperse and hard-to-
quantify benefits of a proposed regulation.
10 9
Again in the abstract, precautionary and cost-benefit analysis both agree
that the function of regulation is to ensure the costs imposed by social activity,
including environmental costs, do not outweigh the benefits. However, once
uncertainty enters the mix, the two approaches differ sharply, reflecting
different conceptions of the proper role of regulation, and different
a precautionary approach and the precautionary principle are synonymous. TROUWBORST, supra note 91,
at 3-6 (pointing out that many international agreements use the terms interchangeably). The debate over
this distinction is beyond the scope of this Article.
105. See Andy Stirling, The Precautionary Principle in Science and Technology, in
REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 85, at 61; Malcolm MacGarvin, Science,
Precaution, Facts and Values, in REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 85, at
35, 49 (claiming that cost-benefit analysis is a narrow subset of precautionary analysis that provides less
complete information about risks and that elides the ambiguity inherent in scientific analysis of events in
complex systems).
106. Rio Declaration, supra note 15, Principle 15.
107. Tipson, supra note 79, at 574.
108. Ulrich Beck introduced the idea of a "risk society." ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY:
TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark A. Ritter trans., 5th ed. 2004); ULRICH BECK, ECOLOGICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF THE RISK SOCIETY (Mark A. Ritter trans., Humanities
Press 1995) (1991).
109. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered
Species: Why Less is More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 129, 180-83 (2004) (identifying instances where monetizing benefits proved impossible).
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perspectives on the ramifications and consequences that flow from gaps in the
scientific information offered to underpin a decision. Where precaution tries
to weigh the costs of ignorance and views incomplete scientific information as
a reason to proceed with caution, cost-benefit analysis can justify only a thin
margin of safety as a response to a lack of scientific information.' 1
0
If we take seriously the proposition that law is more than filling gaps in
a dogmatic system but is instead a means of understanding-a
hermeneutic 'II-then we must confront rather than obscure the subjective
nature of the tradeoffs among competing priorities that regulation (or a
decision not to regulate) entails. To the extent that the New Haven School
writings help focus attention on the enormity of consequence embedded in
this contest over how authoritative decisionmakers will interpret sustainable
development, they can serve as a reminder that that every rule and indeed
every decision that balances environmental and economic interests contains a
glimmering of the horizon at which the rule ceases to operate, no matter how
seemingly objective or universalized.
D. Inherent Value Judgments and Political Concerns
For New Haven School thinkers, interdisciplinarity is a key element of
problem-oriented jurisprudence. A danger in such an approach, however, is
that legal decisionmakers can become enthralled with the methods they have
borrowed from other disciplines, methods that are often poorly understood or
over-simplified, and lose sight of the goals they were trying to achieve in the
first place. As more and more lawyers attempt to wield the analytical tools of
other disciplines-particularly economics-that point bears repeating.
Economic considerations, rather than being used as one of many tools for
understanding law, have in many ways become law's master-a confusion
between means and ends that has somehow left at least some policymakers
with the impression that economic efficiency is the end they are trying to
achieve, rather than a factor to consider while working to achieve the wholly
independent substantive goal of sustainability. 12 Moreover, use of borrowed
methodological tools often gives decisionmakers a dangerous illusion that
they are engaged in a mathematical or value-neutral process, rather than a
deeply contextual process of choosing competing means toward a politically-
110. For a discussion of this point, see Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary
Principle in Germany-Enabling Government, in REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,
supra note 85, at 31, 52-57.
111. See Cover, supra note 17, at 40; see also James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading
Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 415 (1982).
112. Note, for example, the repeated argument from those advocating cost-benefit analysis that
the focus of all law, including environmental law, should be on increasing material prosperity. Their
rationale is that increased prosperity creates a demand for environmental amenities, and the best way to
improve the lealth and living conditions of the poor is not to require pollution reduction or health
measures but to "get out of the way" of commercial measures that will bring universal prosperity. See,
e.g., Frank Cross, The Naive Environmentalist, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 477, 493 (2002); Cross, supra
note 95, at 85 1; Robert W. Tracinski, "Sustainable " Development's Unsustainable Contradictions,
CAPITALISM MAG., Sept. 14, 2002, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=1858; see also Bjom
Lomborg, Carl Pope & Dan Glickman, The Global Environment: Improving or Deteriorating, Remarks
at Harvard University Institute of Politics Symposium (Mar. 13, 2003), transcript available at
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/pdfs/transcripts/lomborg.and-pope-03.13.03.pdf.
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identified end." 3 With this caution in mind, let us turn to an assessment of the
alternative analytical processes and the balances they strike between
sustainable development's dialectical priorities.
Cost-benefit analysis and precautionary analysis represent different
culturally-framed conceptions of the appropriate role that science, economics,
ethics, politics, and law play in developing plans for sustainable
environmental protection and management. Initial policy decisions about what
constitutes a risk or a benefit, and how those risks and benefits will be
measured, weighted, and compared will often be outcome determinative.
These culturally-bound and value-driven decisions demarcate the realm within
which the purportedly "neutral" scientific process of cost-benefit analysis
occurs. Thus, a close examination of cost-benefit analysis reinforces the New
Haven School caution that how one contextualizes jurisprudence determines
not only how one frames the problems that law must resolve but also the tools
one will employ in that assessment. 
1 4
The focus of environmental law is predominately non-monetary benefits
from and costs to what has been characterized as "natural capital""115 -
functioning ecosystems, existing species, and other environmental amenities
like beauty and ecosystem services. In many ways, these costs and benefits are
incommensurate with monetary costs. That makes the process of cost-benefit
analysis deeply political. What monetary value," 6 for example, should be
assigned to a capstone species that provides critical environmental services," 
7
113. Indeed, one of the great insights of Beck's risk society is that scientific concepts, laws and
theories are all socially constructed. As such, these concepts are the product of particular, value-laden
perspectives. Gerard Valenduc et al., Intermediary Scientific Report (Sci. & Precaution in Interactive
Risk Evaluation, Working Paper No. 2, 2003), available at http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c
=*SPIRE&n= 17370&ct=012301 &e=29067.
114. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Prologue, supra note 8, at 196.
115. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service
Districts, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 333 (2001); J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-
Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 59 (1999).
116. One of the great conflicts within cost-benefit analysis has been over use of a "willingness
to pay" standard as a proxy to value resources for which there is no obvious market. Such a metric has
been rigorously criticized as privileging consumer preferences over societal ideals and values, MARK
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 27, 56, 65 (1988); privileging the desires of the rich over those of
the poor, DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
18, 37, 44, 49, 76 (1991), and C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL.
& PUB. AFT. 3, 6 (1975); failing to acknowledge that reported preferences may not be congruent with
actual welfare, Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000), and Daniel A. Farber, The Problematics of
the Pareto Principle (U.C. Berkeley Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 114, 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=384142; and-perhaps most significantly-ignoring the extent to which
existing social conditions (including the legal system) and behavioral psychology shape reported
preferences, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 32-50 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000), Amy Sinden, In Defense of
Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1423-30
(2005), John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640-87 (1999). Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and
Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
23, 35-55 (1989).
117. Ecosystem services are the biological underpinning of human society. NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). In addition
to the direct production of goods like animals and plants (many of which are traded in markets), some of
the most obvious ecosystem services that ought to be valued for purposes of any cost-benefit analysis
include: purification of air and water, detoxification and decomposition of wastes, regulation of climate,
regeneration of soil fertility and production, and maintenance of biodiversity. Gretchen C. Daily et al.,
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or to soil fertility regeneration through nutrient recycling?" 8 What costs are
imposed by the loss of a healthy and diverse gene pool for a particular species
like salmon that is both an important source of food and an important cultural
icon? 119 It is precisely these diffuse, non-monetary costs and benefits-the
ones of central concern to environmental law and sustainable development-
that fit least well into a cost-benefit analysis. They are by nature elusive,
intangible, and diffuse. The inability to accurately value these costs and
benefits undercuts a premise at the heart of cost-benefit analysis itself: that
relevant costs and benefits can be known and compared (i.e., that they are
"commensurable" in some way).120
Politicization of the purportedly neutral cost-benefit analysis does not
end with the inherent value judgments involved in its analytical framework.
The U.S. experience offers a plethora of examples of how cost-benefit
Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies by Natural Ecosystems, ISSUES IN ECOLOGY,
Spring 1997, at 1. Any attempt to place monetary values on these services is fraught with difficulties
because it is not known how degraded these services already are and whether the systems can absorb
further impairment without significant harm. Without knowing how interdependent different ecosystem
services are, and to what extent they are capable of self-restoration over a human timeframe, any
valuation would be pure speculation. To get around this problem, these aspects are typically ignored in a
cost-benefit analysis.
118. Waste recycling and disposal hinges on the interaction of the lifecycles of various bacteria
and detritivoures with planet-wide cycles of carbon, nitrogen, and other elements. How does one place a
value on this life-sustaining process? A fundamental disruption of the cycle would prevent, damage, or
destroy human activities worth trillions of dollars annually. See, e.g., E.O. Wilson, The Little Things
That Run the World (The Importance and Conservation of Invertebrates), I CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
344 (1987). Because these benefits are not traded in markets, however, they carry no price tags and
attempts to assign dollar values systematically undervalue them, with distortion often introduced
through inappropriate discounting. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling explore this point in detail.
See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 800, at 181-198. They characterize cost-benefit analysis as
"involv[ing] the creation of artificial markets for things-like good health, long life, and clean air-that
are not bought and sold." Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562 (2002).
119. The State of Alaska reports that salmon fisheries are a $300 million per year industry.
DOUG EGGERS, ALASKA DEP'T OF FISH & GAME, RUN FORECAST AND HARVEST PROJECTIONS FOR 2007
ALASKA SALMON FISHERIES AND REVIEW OF THE 2006 SEASON 2 (2007), available at
http://www.sf.adfg.state.ak.us/FedAidpdfs/sp07-0l.pdf. However, that number only scratches the
surface of values added to Alaskan society from healthy salmon populations. An assessment of wild
Pacific salmon's value for purposes of a cost-benefit analysis must go beyond its mere commercial value
in the marketplace to include attendant value generated through tourism and employment, as well as to
the existence value of the species, its contribution to self-respect, and to the aesthetic and intellectual
appreciation of life. COMM. ON ASSESSING AND VALUING THE SERVICES OF AQUATIC AND RELATED
TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, NAT. RES. COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 34-40 (2005) (discussing the role of economic valuation of
ecosystems); David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 343 (2004) (discussing existence value).
120. The concept of "incommensurability" has been the subject of considerable academic
attention. Items are incommensurable if there is no common metric by which they can be assessed and
ranked. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 118 (1996) ("By commensurability, I
mean that values of things can be arrayed as a function of one continuous variable, or can be linearly
ranked."). For discussions of incommensurability and cost-benefit analysis, see generally ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 44-64, 190-216 (1993); Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 431, 432-33, 484-87 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 841-43 (1994); and Lawrence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). For a particularly
thoughtful analysis of the incommensurability problem from a proponent of cost-benefit analysis, see
Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1293, 1427 (2003).
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analysis can be deliberately shaped to point toward politically desired results.
From the construction of canals through Louisiana wetlands, 121 to the
redaction of the assessment of climate change,' 22 to the very act of developing
cost-benefit analysis protocols, 123 overt political interests have not only
influenced the elements to be weighed in a cost-benefit analysis, but have also
directed how these items are placed on the scales and how the final tally is
totaled up. Cost-benefit analysis is the product of direct-as well as
inherent-political processes, rather than a value-neutral "scientific" process.
VI. CONCLUSION
We live in a world of ever-increasing interactions on a global scale. The
constantly accelerating rate of technological change means that the range and
intensity of these interactions are rapidly expanding. The ramifications of
these interactions transcend all national or other man-made boundaries.
Writing forty years ago, Lasswell and McDougal presciently described this
convergence, and began the process of thinking rigorously about its
consequences for law,
The realities of global warming, ozone depletion, desertification, and
spreading invasive species make a mockery of the traditional distinction
between transboundary and wholly domestic harms. 124 If we are to live
together and flourish on our shrinking, warming planet, we must reach beyond
oversimplified and dated dichotomies, ones that place international and
domestic law in separate realms. In the globalized arena, few, if any, matters
are purely domestic. Instead, countless decisions made by individuals, private
corporate actors, and government officials at every level have effects beyond
the borders of any single nation-state. The New Haven School's efforts to
grapple with the global community as an authoritative decisionmaker resonate
profoundly with the struggle to confront global environmental challenges. In
121. See LOUISIANA COASTAL WETLANDS CONSERVATION AND RESTORATION TASK FORCE &
WETLANDS CONSERVATION AND RESTORATION AUTHORITY, COAST 2050: TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE
COASTAL LOUISIANA 40-44, 54-57 (1998), available at http://www.lca.gov/net-prod-download/public/
Ica..net-pubproducts/doc/2050report.pdf (describing the adverse environmental effects of the canals).
See generally Northeast Midwest Institute, Large-scale Ecosystem Restoration Initiatives, Protecting and
Restoring Coastal Louisiana, http://www.nemw.org/Iouisiana.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2007) (providing
detailed information about the challenges facing Louisiana wetlands).
122. Juliet Eilperin, Climate Researchers Feeling Heat from White House, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
2006, at A27; Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Edited Climate Reports: Ex-Oil Lobbyist Softened
Greenhouse Gas Links, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2005, at Al; Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seelye,
Report by EPA Leaves Out Data on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al.
123. For example, in 2006, the United States Office of Management and Budget proposed a
system for standardizing risk-assessment and cost-benefit analysis across federal agencies. Off. of
Mgmt. & Budget, Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, 71 Fed. Reg. 2600 (proposed Jan. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed riskassessmentbulletin_010906.pdf.
The National Research Council, among others, issued a scathing critique of this proposal, characterizing
it as deeply flawed and likely to increase manipulation of data to achieve predetermined results. The
proposal was characterized as incomplete, unbalanced, and unsalvageable. NAT. RES. COUNCIL,
SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET 4-5, 67 (2007).
124. For a thorough exploration of this question, see TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 33.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32: 363
particular, New Haven School thinking might provide a more effective way to
take the needs of future generations into account.
New Haven School ideas provide a complex mixture of lessons for this
analysis. The important and deep connection between law and politics can
inform an exploration of how nation-states go about defining sustainable
development. However, the reader is encouraged to look beyond superficial
claims of neutrality and to reject the notion that science can somehow provide
a way out of the problems that this connection entails.
The New Haven School is often criticized for the opacity of its
methodology. 125 Through the lens of time, the various New Haven School
matrices and assessment tools seem not only cumbersome but also vaguely
quixotic. 126 The contemporary reader cannot but question what appears to be
an unrealistic quest for precision in a world of chaos and change. 127 Moreover,
the New Haven School methodology has too often provided convenient
justifications for United States Cold War policies-thus undermining claims
that its matrices enable decisionmakers to achieve a meta-state beyond
parochial political concerns.
Nevertheless, much of the intellectual premise behind the New Haven
School frameworks and matrices is sound, and some of its basic insights ring
true today-successful legal analysis must be contextual, problem-oriented,
and multi-disciplinary. 128 The New Haven School frameworks can serve as a
guidepost for systematically exploring the context in which problems and
possible solutions arise across time, place, and space.
That said, the lessons offered by earlier New Haven School thinkers for
environmental problem-solving are cautionary as well as salutary. A simple
reading of their rhetoric about science might lead a reader to facile
conclusions about how New Haven School ideas inform the cost-benefit
versus precautionary analysis debate. A more nuanced grappling with the
School's voluminous literature reveals that precautionary analysis and cost-
benefit analysis both find authority in strands of New Haven School thought,
and suggests that a more robust engagement with New Haven School ideas
might inspire new approaches to get beyond the current stalemate.
125. Many have suggested that the use of overly complex terminology makes much of the New
Haven School's scholarship impenetrable to those not willing to invest in learning the "meta-language."
See DUXBURY, supra note 82, at 166-67 (implying that Lasswell's departure from the University of
Chicago was at least partly related to the impenetrability of his "specialized vocabulary"). For a spirited
defense of the terminology and methodology employed by the New Haven School scholars, see Moore,
supra note 8, at 674-80.
126. See Moore, supra note 8 (identifying value analysis, phase analysis, and authority function
as differing matrices applied by the New Haven School); see also Suzuki, supra note 11 (detailing the
analysis under each matrix). Each of these matrices comes with a bewildering assortment of variables-
power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude along the value matrix;
public order, civic order, common interests, and special interests along the interest matrix; intelligence,
promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination, appraisal, and participants as the decision
matrix; and participants, perspectives, situations, base values, strategies, outcomes, efforts along the
phases matrix-each with subcategories and functional alternatives. The sheer number of these variables
overwhelms inquiry at its inception.
127. To say this is not to reopen the constructivist/objectivist science war that raged in the
1990s. For a very interesting discussion of that debate, see generally BEYOND THE SCIENCE WARS: THE
MISSING DISCOURSE ABOUT SCIENCE AND SOCIETY (Ullica Segerstrale ed., 2000).
128. Suzuki, supra note 1I, at 46.
2007] Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Environmental Law 391
Reframing a New Haven School-inspired analysis as one process of
inquiry among many, rather than as the path or a correct answer, demonstrates
just how much the School offers environmental decisionmaking. Its emphasis
on the perspectives of decisionmakers, its recognition that decisions are
inherently about policy, and its embrace of interdisciplinary investigation
offer a means to account for the complex interdependencies that pervade
environmental interactions. That accounting might spark new thinking about
comprehensive solutions capable of serving the entire global community.

